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The potential for collisions with natural particles (meteoroids) at relative
velocities up to 72 km/sec (155,000 mph) has historically been a design consideration for
spacecraft. The deposition of man-made particles, referred to as orbital debris, into orbit
around the Earth presented an even more severe hypervelocity impact problem for
spacecraft designers. This paper examines the threat to the International Space Station
Alpha (JSSA) imposed by the meteoroid/orbital debris (M/OD) environment and the risk
management approaches implemented to mitigate the threat.
The ISSA program has established a balanced strategy for managing the risks
associated with the M/OD threat based on the following three principles: I) maximize
design protection by implementing state-of-the-art shielding, 2) track and avoid the larger
objects, and 3) minimize residual risk by implementing risk control and abatement
features and procedures.
Even though NASA is using effective hardware and operational risk mitigation
approaches, there remains a residual risk of a penetrating impact. Due to weight, volume,
and funding constraints, a gap exists between the passive protection (shielding) capability
and active protection (collision avoidance) lower particle size tracking limits.
Fortunately, the estimated number of impacts per year decreases exponentially as the size
of the particle increases. With the implemented design and planned operational measures,
the resulting residual risk of an impact that could potentially cause severe damage to the
station is extremely small. Options are continually being assessed and implemented to
reduce the residual risk and increase reliability. Control of the debris threat is being
pursued by NASA through international treaties and agreements among all space-faring
nations. These agreements refer to guidelines for the design, development and operation
of satellites with the intent to reduce the evolving orbital debris environment.

I. I NTRODUC"flON
The potential for collisions with natural particles (meteoroids) at relative
velocities up to 72 km/sec (155,000 mph) has historically been a design consideration for
spacccrnfl. The deposition of man-made particles, referred to as orbital debris, into orbit
around the Earth presented an even more severe hypervelocity impact problem for
spacecraft designers. This paper examines the threat to the Jntcrnational Space Station
Alpha (ISSA) imposed by the meteoroid/orbital debris (M/OD) environment and the risk
management approaches implemented to mitigate the threat.
2. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE MIOD THREAT
The Oux of M/OD particles that arc encountered by an object in low Earth orbit is
essentially random but lends ilSclf well to statistical quantification of the number of
particles of a given characteristic size that would be encountered by a rnndomly tumbling
Oat plate per unit area and time. Flux is defined as number of intercepted objects per unit
time and area, typically in terms of per square meter per year. The primary method of
charncterizing the threat of significant damage to the ISSA operating within the M/OD
environment is described in temis of a probability of no penetration (PNP). The PNP
function is described as:
PNPJd > IJ,·111 I = e fu1
where

I =

1~nctrating Oux, number of panid cs per s4uare meter per year of
diameter d (Jf larger that defeat the shielding (0,.,i1 )

a = effective area ol spacecraft, s4. meters
1

= time in space, years

2.1 Meteoroids
Meteoroids arc naturnl bodies remaining from the formation of the solar system or
from col lisions of other natural bodies making up the solar system. Nearly all meteoroids
originate from comets or asteroids. The meteoroid Oux represents al any time a total of
aboul 200 kg or mass within 2000 km of the Earth's surface. Most of this mass is
concentrated in 0.1 mm or smaller micrometeoroids.
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The precession of the spacecraft's orbit and tilt of the Earth's equatorial plane relative to
the ecliptic contribute to making the micromctcoroid environment relatively
omnidirectional. The micrometcoroid threat becomes anisotropic relative to the
spacecraft moving through the environment with most strikes coming from the direction
of motion. Further, shadowing provided by the Earth tends to reduce strikes in the
direction of the Earth (nadir).
The meteoroid environment model remains relatively unchanged since its initial
documentation in the l 960's. The implemented model is very similar to that used for the
design and assessment of Apollo, Skylab, and Shuttle. In discussions with Russian
technical experts, the NASA meteoroid model was determined to be very similar to the
model that was used for the design of their spacecraft including the currently orbiting
MIR. This time proven model is being used for ISSA design.
2.2 Orbital Debris
Man-made orbital debris differs from natural meteoroids because it remains in
Earth orbit during its lifetime instead of passing through the space around the Earth.
Within 2000 km of the Earth's surface there is an estimated 1.5 to 3 mi llion kg of manmade orbiting objects as ofmid 1988. Most of these arc in high inclination orbi ts where
they sweep past each other at an average velocity of 10 km/s. About 1500 spent rocket
stages, inactive payloads, and a few active payloads account for most of this mass. These
objects along with 4500 others totaling about 20,000 kg, arc mostly fragments of satell ites
or other orbiting hardware. Observations indicate a total mass of about I 000 kg for
orbital debris with diameters of 1 cm or smaller and about 300 kg for orbital debris sizes
smaller than 1 mm. This distribution of mass makes the orbital debris environment more
hazardous than the meteoroid environment in most spacecraft applications below 2000
km altitude as is certainly the case fo r ISSA .
Figure 1 shows the comparison of meteoroid and orbital debris fluxes as a functio n
of size from the environmental model currently bascl incd for ISSA design. As a result of
measurements and analyses of the orbital debris environment conducted over the last
three years, revisions to the orbital envi ronment model for the space station arc being
formulated and arc now under review. The measurements and analyses indicate that the
Oux for orbital debris larger than 0.5 cm at space station altitudes is as much as a fac tor of
two lower than current model predictions.
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Figure I. ComparisonofMeteoroid
and Orbital Debris Flux

3. M/OD PROTECTION AND RISK MANAGEMENT
3.1 Strategic Plan
The ISSA program has established a strategy for managing the risks associated
with the M/OD threat based on the following three principles: I) maximize design
protection by implementing state-of-the-art shielding, 2) track and avoid the larger

objects, and 3) minimize residual risk by implementing risk control and abatement
features and procedures. This three part approach to the strategic plan is related to the

small, midrange, and large particle size regimes illustrated in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. M/OD Stncegic Plan

Over 99% of the number o f threatening particles arc small enough (microscopic to
marble size) that the potentially damaging penetrations may be avoided by hardware
protection systems (shielding). For this reason, primary emphasis is placed on design
protection as the preferred method of risk mitigation. Operational mitigation approaches
include scheduled maintenance and repair activities and collision avoidance maneuvers.
Even though NASA is using effective hardware and operational risk mitigation
approaches, there remains a residual risk of a penetrating impact. Due to weight, volume,
and funding constraints, a gap exists between the passive protection (shielding) capability
and active protection (collision avoidance) lower particle size tracking limits.
Fortunately, the estimated number of impacts per year decreases exponentially as the size
of the particle increases. With the implemented design and planned operational measures,
the resulting residual risk of an impact that could potcmially cause severe damage to the
station is e:ittremcly small. Penetration effects analyses examine the potential hazards
associated with a penetration of a habitable module or other critical item. These analyses
are used to assess the ability of the ISSA to safely pcrfonn its mission with a reliability
gos! of great« than 99.7% per year. Options arc continually OCing assessed and
implemented to reduce the residual risk and increase reliability.
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3.2 Hardware Design Protection
The hardware design protection strategy consists of dedicated shielding of M/OD
critical items. An item is classified as M/OD critical when effects resulting from a
penetration could immediately endanger the survivability of the space station or the crew
(items primarily consist of the habitable modules). Although all exposed components are
subject to M/OD impacts, those which do not impose immediate, time critical hazards to
crew or station survival are evaluated and shown to meet against established equipment
performance and maintainability criteria.
The basic shielding techniques
utilized on the U.S. habitable modules
consists
of a thin plate of aluminum
trjla:;ting
with a stand off from the pressure wall
9 Pme
(see Figure 3). Known as a "Whipple"
BUMPER - 6061-TG 11..mrum
shield, this simple but highly effective
4'Standoff
technique utilizes the outer bumper to
break up the impacting particle into
MULTILAYER INSULATION (MU) ~I
smaller pieces thus distributing the
impact on the primary wall. Due to
MU Placement
the tremendous level of energy
PRESSURE WAll - 2219-187 AUniun
dissipated during an impact, characterization of the event is complicated by
Figure 3. Typkal Whipple Shield
the transphase/multiphase physical
processes and thennodynamics of the events that follow. Hypervelocity impact testing
at velocities up to 7 km/s and sophisticated hydrocode analytical simulations are used to
characterize the penetration resistance of M/OD shielding.

l

Recent NASA developments in shield technology have advanced the state-of-theart in hardware protection systems. Enhanced shielding incorporating intermediate nonmetallic layers of Nextel™ (3-M Corp.) and Kevlar™ (DuPont) will be used on the U.S.
Hab and Lab modules. The penetration resistance of these shields result in PNP levels of
greater than 99.8% per year. Figure 4 is a hydrocode simulation of a "stuffed" Whipple
shield stopping a 0.849 cm diameter particle.
Should the M/OD flux levels increase greater than anticipated environment growth
during the operational life of the station, the capability to further mitigate the risk is
designed into the station. Mounting locations are included in the hardware to allow for
on-orbit addition ofM/OD shielding.
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Figure 4. "Stuffed" Whipple Impact Simulation

3.3 Debris Collision Avoidance

Orbital debris is tracked and cataloged by the United States Space Command
(USSPACECOM) Space Surveillance Network. Currently USSPACECOM assists
NASA by providing information that is used to determine the need for performing debris
avoidance maneuvers for the space shuttle orbiter. The ISSA program plans to continue
this arrangement and is now developing procedures for executing debris collision
avoidance maneuvers.
Utilizing existing network capabilities to track particles down to approximately
10 cm diameter, debris avoidance maneuvers will be executed as required to avoid
collisions with the larger objects. Early estimates indicate from I to 10 maneuvers per
year may be expected. The actual number of maneuvers anticipated in a year is a function
of estimated debris flux, relative position uncertainties, and collision probability
thresholds yet to be established. These thresholds will be carefully derived to minimize
risk of collisions while still permitting the space station to carry out its scientific mission
objectives.
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3.4 Risk Abatement and Control
Additional measures are being pursued to reduce potential M/OD hazards
including: hatch closure protocols to isolate modules in the event of a depressurization,
penetration repair procedures, internal spall blankets to minimize effects of debris
fragments, advanced test and analysis techniques to reduce uncertainties in the
penetration resistance equations, and refined penetration effects analysis. Further,
operations procedures may be modified during periods of high flux (i.e., meteor storms).
An integral part of risk management is a long term commitment by NASA to
monitor the debris environment over the ISSA operational period accompanied by
assessments of the updated environment. Control of the debris threat is being pursued
through international treaties and agreements among all space-faring nations. These
agreements refer to guidelines for the design, development and operation of s:ifollites with
the intent to reduce the evolving orbital debris environment.

4. SUMMARY
Protecting the ISSA from meteoroids and orbital debris is particuliirly challenging
due to its long mission duration and large surface area. A multifaceted strategy and longterm risk management program to achieve safe and reliable operations has been
implemented by the ISSA program. The NASA, prime contractor, and international
partner team is committed to producing innovative and practical solutions to the M/OD
challenge.
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